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CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING -HOW IT IS INTEDNED TO WORK AND CHALLENGES TO ITS SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION
A central objective of the Quadrennial Defense Review was to shift the basis of defense planning from a "threat-based" model that has dominated thinking in the past, to a "capabilities-based" model for the future. This capabilities-based model focuses more on how adversaries fight, rather than specifically whom the adversary might be or where a war might occur. It recognizes that it is not enough to plan for large conventional wars in distant theaters. Instead, the United States must identify the capabilities required in order to defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare to achieve their objectives. 1 Donald Rumsfeld A thought is often original, though you have uttered it a hundred times. 2 Oliver Wendell Holmes
BACKGROUND
The Department of Defense (DoD) is working feverously to implement a capabilitiesbased requirements-to-resources system. This transformation of the requirements generation and resourcing processes holds promise for delivering more warfighting capabilities to the Combatant Commanders in a resource constrained environment, but there are also several significant challenges to its successful implementation. The purpose of this paper is to outline the reasons for the change, the capabilities-based planning process, and the most pressing challenges to its implementation.
WHY CHANGE TO A CAPABILITIES-BASED APPROACH?
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review directed the initiation of a capabilities-based approach to defining defense requirements. The primary reason for this change was to address an uncertain future environment in which the United States cannot predict who its next opponent might be. The emphasis was placed on delivering capabilities to address a wide range of threats to the Nation's security rather than on delivering the capability to defeat a specific adversary. 3 "The desired end state is a streamlined, collaborative, yet competitive process that produces a fully-integrated joint warfighting capability." 
Rumsfeld remarked that
What happens in the Department of Defense-and it runs me up the wall-is each service comes up with their things…and how in the world do you get those four things into a single fighting force at the end? It's a train wreck…every year when you're trying to do a budget. It's just a meat grinder trying to pull things together because they didn't start coming together earlier at a lower level. And we're going to fix that. I'll be the meat grinder.
5
The left-hand side of Figure 1 represents a simplified version of the old Requirements Generation System that Secretary Rumsfeld alluded to. Each of the services had their own vision of warfighting, and generated required capabilities to fulfill their vision. These required capabilities were derived within a system where "Service developments were conceived and tested against Service-focused scenarios that often assumed away the contributions of other Services to the warfight." 6 Then these service-centric capabilities were presented to DoD where, "after a massive amount of work had been done, the Joint community, at nearly the very end, attempted to integrate these independent proposals into an integrated force."
The new capability-based planning approach is represented by the right-hand side of Figure 1 . Instead of trying to integrate Service-centric capabilities at the end of the process, the new approach inverts the paradigm. The basic principle is that the warfighting vision (how we intend to fight) and strategic direction are born joint at the DoD level at the start of the process.
This does not imply that the Services no longer participate in determining the required capabilities. In fact, "Service participation is critical to developing joint perspectives throughout
Requirements Generation System (RGS)
Capability-Based Approach grouping of resources by defined capability groups, while the FYDP was the first grouping of resources by function rather than budget account. Among the original capabilities-based principles of PPBS was that -Decisions should be based on explicit criteria of national interest, not on compromises.
-Needs and costs must be considered simultaneously.
-Major decisions should be made by choices among explicit, balanced, feasible alternatives.
14 Perhaps the first major defense decision to be implemented though a capabilities-based PPBS approach was the restructure of the strategic retaliatory nuclear force in the 1960s. The history of this decision can be an instructive lens through which to view the ongoing return to capabilities-based planning within DoD. The analysis focused on the output of "damage inflicted and received given alternative force structures." 15 Multiple scenarios were considered to account for uncertainty and ambiguity. It resulted in a large restructuring of the strategic force.
It also cancelled major acquisition programs and rejected several alternatives over the objection of the Service Chiefs. Secretary of Defense McNamara used capabilities-based, systemic analyses to inform his decision-making, and then implemented these civilian-controlled decisions that spanned policy and program. The focus was on providing a cost-effective capability to defend the Nation (defined as least cost way to achieve maximum damage differential), rather than on the performance of any specific individual system. 16 The TTCP laid out the generic planning process shown in Figure 2 . 21 The process is designed to start with overarching guidance that drives priorities. These priorities are then viewed in the context of a wide range of scenarios representing possible futures, possible threats, and technology projections as well as friendly operational concepts that represent how the friendly force intends to fight. Note that this process is not non-threat-based versus the old so-called threat-based. It assesses capabilities against a wide range of scenarios and threats to address uncertainty rather than addressing a monolithic threat in limited scenarios and assuming that other cases are lesser stress that can be handled by the force designed to address the monolithic threat. 22 Due to the complex nature of the problem, the analysis is divided into manageable areas of like capability that the TTCP termed capability partitions and yields capability goals for each capability partition. 23 These capability goals are then assessed in light of operational concepts, current and already planned capabilities, and feedback from previous development efforts to identify areas where there is a mismatch between capabilities and capability goals. This mismatch can be a gap where a capability does not exist (potential FIGURE 2. GENERIC PROCESS CHART OF CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING 24 area for investment), or an excess where a capability overmatch exists (potential area for divestment). 25 The results of the capability mismatch are used to develop force options that are reviewed in light of priorities and resource constraints to inform investment decisions that yield an affordable plan for capability development. K-Mart made strategic decisions to optimize sub-sections of their business. For example, K-Mart subcontracted trucking operations because they thought it was less expensive than operating their own, and even leased out some in-store departments to subcontractors based on calculations that the lease payments were more profitable than sales revenue. is on providing the Combatant Commanders the capabilities they need to accomplish the missions that they have been given to provide the Nation a suitable, feasible, and acceptable defense in a resource constrained environment. Central to this business approach is that "a capability is only advantageous if it brings value to the customer." 30 Therefore, no matter how great an individual Service developed capability might be, if it does not add value to a Joint capability that a Combatant Commander needs, then it ought to have no inherent value to the system.
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CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING FOR CIVILIAN BUSINESS -AN ANALOGY
A key finding of business management studies is that "only the CEO can focus the entire organization on creating capabilities," 31 particularly when these moves can often create shortterm losses for the business units. Secretary Rumsfeld's adage "I'll be the meat grinder," 32 his consistent push towards capability-based planning since assuming his position as Secretary of Defense, and his ability to cancel major weapons programs (analogous to business unit losses for the Services) indicate that he understands this principle.
CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING PROCESS FOR DEFENSE -U.S. APPROACH
In 
A SHIFT IN EMPHASIS
In its Final Report, the Aldridge team argued that the previous requirements-to-resources system was appropriate when the United States faced a known monolithic threat that dominated other threats and could reasonably be predicted years in advance. However, the team argued, this system was not an appropriate method to identify needs when the United States cannot predict who or where it's next adversary may be. According to the team, the adoption of a capabilities-based approach provides capabilities to address a wide range of potential adversaries or other security challenges, thus mitigating the uncertainty of current threat projections. The study team also proffered that a capabilities-based approach provided an effects-based rather than system-specific approach and that it addressed both materiel and non-materiel solutions to requirements, inferring that the threat-based approach was materielcentric. Finally, the team indicated that a capabilities-based approach would be supportive of a top-down planning approach, ensuring that Service-centric "stove-pipe" solutions would not be forced on the warfighter. 35 A key piece of the transition strategy envisioned by the Aldridge team was a shift in emphasis during the process. As shown in the left-hand side of Figure 3 , the existing process was dominated by the resourcing phase. The new process was intended to concentrate on strategy and planning to drive a responsive resourcing phase, and then ensure proper executing and accountability to inform the next iteration. Rumsfeld moved to implement the emerging process represented by this model even before the Aldridge team report was published. The stated goal was "a streamlined and collaborative, yet competitive, process that produces fully integrated joint warfighting capabilities." 38 The basic idea is for strategy to drive planning, and planning to drive resourcing. The services will resource the plan and be graded on how well they resource and execute the plan.
Strategy
In Commander capability needs, redundancies, and an assessment of risks resulting from balancing tasks and available resources." 42 This brings the customers into the process in a meaningful way, allowing them to directly influence the derivation of capability requirements that the process will analyze. In effect, the Combatant Commanders now get to ask directly for the long-term capabilities that their successors will need to accomplish their assigned missions, and to participate in the capability trade-off decisions.
Enhanced Planning Process
Secretary Rumsfeld intended the enhanced planning process shown in the large square on the left-hand side of Figure 4 to be "an enhanced, collaborative joint planning process that will formulate and assess major issues and present them for my decision. and to better integrate it with the other pieces of the process. 46 The JCIDS top-down process for identifying needed capabilities, represented in Figure 5 adheres to the principles outlined in the TTCP process model in Figure 2 .
Strategic guidance, to include the published Strategic Planning Guidance, are inputs to the JCIDS process. Another key input is the Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) that "describes how the Joint Force intends to operate within the next 15 to 20 years." 47 It is a very broad document and does not address the means required to implement the conceptual method of warfighting. 48 The emphasis in JOpsC is on attributes. 49 The JOpsC serves as a framework for subordinate concepts and capabilities. capabilities." 53 The emphasis in JOCs is on effects. 
JCIDS Analysis JCIDS Analysis
JFCs built by the FCBs should capture the bulk of the capabilities that will be assessed within their area of responsibility. 56 Per CJCSI 3170.01D, the JFCs must be of "sufficient detail to conduct experimentation and measure effectiveness." 57 The emphasis in JFCs is on capabilities. 58 The evolving Joint Concept Development and Revision Plan defines JIC as "a description of how a Joint Force Commander 10-20 years in the future will integrate capabilities to generate effects and achieve an objective." 59 A JIC integrates the capabilities that cut across many operational, functional, and Service lines. For example, a JIC for forcible entry operations may contain the integration of a JOC for major combat operations, a JFC for force application, and the Army's concept for force application in forcible entry operations. This integration must be performed across all complex overlapping capabilities. While not currently defined, "another set of documents is under development to help determine capabilities needed for those situations." 60 The emphasis in JICs is on tasks while addressing capabilities and effects. 
SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES FOR IMPLEMENTATION.
As DoD implemented the Capabilities-Based Planning approach, several challenges were identified that should be addressed to fully realize the potential of this approach. These challenges include developing a common analytic agenda, establishing a capable organizational structure to execute the process, and, significantly, developing a Capabilities-Based Planning
Framework that links resources to planning.
COMMON ANALYTIC AGENDA
Numerous approaches are emerging as to how analyses should be performed in a capabilities-based planning environment. A common theme amongst the approaches is that, to be meaningful, similar capabilities must be analyzed under similar conditions. In other words, there must be an "apples-to-apples" comparison. This implies that common scenarios must be developed for use by all stakeholders. It also implies that a common approach to modeling and other assessment tools, using common performance data, may need to be developed and implemented across components. The team foresaw that this could require strengthening the FCBs, and one of their alternatives suggested creating a corporate planning staff within the Secretariat. 67 Other analysts have proposed providing more full-time manning for the FCBs. 68 The danger with either of these approaches is that they risk insulating the process from the stakeholders who are currently the FCB participants.
CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING FRAMEWORK.
The Aldridge team believed that "defining joint capability categories is an essential early step to implementing a capabilities-based approach, because they provide the framework for capabilities planning." 69 It was their belief that capability categories are the building blocks upon which strategic guidance, analyses, and programs can be formed, and therefore the basis upon which cross-Service trades can be assessed. 70 The DoD issued Management Initiative Decision (MID) 913 implementing a 2-year Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process on 22 May 2003. This document noted that there was a lack of integration between the capability requirements determination process, the acquisition process, and the program and budget development process, and established a major goal of strategically linking any major decision across these processes. MID 913 directed that the multiple data systems for program and budget preparation be merged into a single system with an underlying structure that can support better management. It also directed the development of a Department-wide framework that could standardize the analytic basis for decisions across the processes. 71 In a May 2004 report, the U.S. General Accounting Office, now called the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO), published a report that noted that the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) "does not contain a link to defense capabilities or the dimensions of the risk management framework" 72 and that this lack of a link seriously limits the usefulness of the FYDP. The GAO also noted that the Major Force Programs that form the framework of the FYDP are not representative of the current capabilities-based planning approach. They acknowledged that DoD has created some additional aggregations in the FYDP, but that these aggregations also do not capture capabilities-based or risk management framework analyses.
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DoD rebutted the GAO report, indicating that DoD does not intend to imbed capabilities or the risk management framework into the FYDP…However, information on programs and platforms contained in the FYDP may be aligned to capabilities or the risk management framework through other analytical tools and processes. DoD is working to create decisionsupport tools that will link resource allocations to capability and risk management frameworks. As these tools and processes mature, DoD may be able to report funding levels for defense capabilities and the dimensions of the risk management framework to Congress. 74 GAO responded strongly in support of a FYDP that would provide transparency between resources and priorities.
Indeed, as the common report that captures all components' future program and budget proposals, the FYDP provides DoD an option for linking resource plans to its risk management framework and capabilities assessment and providing a crosswalk between capabilities and the risk management framework such that assessments of capabilities could be made in terms of the risk management framework, which balances dimensions of risk, such as near term operational risk versus risks associated with mid-to long-term military challenges. 75 The crosswalk suggested by GAO is appealing, but as will be shown, difficult to put into operation.
The Strategic Planning and Budgeting Domain is "one of seven business areas the as shown in Figure 6 , against which all elements of the program and budget data could be aligned. 77 As stated in Mr. Roth's memorandum, "the ultimate goal is to establish a framework with a manageable number of categories and one where each dollar is counted once and only once." 78 The capability definitions that will allow this binning of the program do not yet exist.
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The Joint Staff is working to develop data elements and definitions to enable a datacentric Capabilities-Based Planning Framework. The effort is built upon the presumption that all capabilities can be deconstructed into a set of mutually exclusive elements and attributes that describe the tasks required to effect the capability. This task-deconstruction is based upon defining a new, all-inclusive Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). 80 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Guide 3500.04 provides technical guidance for the formulation of the new UJTL, but does not address how the UJTL is to be used to enable cross-process analyses. though the UCL formulation is still a work in progress. 86 The Army Architecture Integration Cell recognized that the current Joint and Service task lists alone total approximately 1700 tasks, and that there are "too many different joint and cross service architecture building blocks."
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The group also recognized that, as shown in this section of this paper, there are several parallel efforts to define a framework and taxonomy for integrating capabilities-based planning across the requirements, acquisition, programming and budgeting processes of the Department of Defense, and that these parallel efforts need to be converged to a common solution before they can be effective across the processes. 88 Capabilities-Based Planning noted, "it will do little good if we replace old "stovepipes" with new, capability-based stovepipes!" 89 It is imperative that problems with capability identification and binning be overcome. Perhaps the most difficult, yet significant, issues to overcome are the identification and deconfliction of synergies and dependencies between capability bins. 90 An example of the type of question that this leads to, with no current solution identified, is "when performing analyses, how does one account for resources that enable a task that feeds multiple capabilities, or a capability that enables multiple missions to be achieved?" As novel operational concepts and functional concepts evolve that evoke even greater interaction and interdependence of forces and systems, this capability partition problem will be even more difficult to solve. 91 To assess the relative worth of one capability versus another, across partition boundaries, "while laudable, may be beyond the capabilities of the DoD in the near future." WORD COUNT=5904
